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A future  “Smart  Grid”  is increasingly  being  embraced  in  energy  policies  as a promising  energy  scenario
for  the  future,  with  the introduction  of  “smart”  electricity  meters  being  seen  as  the  ﬁrst  step.  In Norway,
this  process  is  happening  without  much  public  debate.  Discussions  of  complexity  and  uncertainty  related
to  the  future  Smart  Grid  are  mainly  taking  place  within  a network  of actors  with  recognized  expertise.
Based  on  empirical  data  from  interviews  and  documentary  analysis,  this  paper  describes  sociotechnical
energy  imaginaries  of  a future  Smart  Grid  in  a  Norwegian  context  from  within  this  network  of  experts,
which  is conceptualized  as  a techno-epistemic  network.
The  future  imaginaries  of  smart  meters  and  a  future  Smart  Grid  are  mainly  technological  and  econom-
ical,  and  they  are partly  permeated  by national  imaginations.  They  connect  the  past  and  the  future  byeﬁcit models providing  solutions  for  current  challenges  in the  energy  supply  system,  which  reﬂect  current  institutional
and  technological  structures.  The  imaginaries  also  include  constructions  of  the public,  or  “consumers”,
which  has  implications  for the  communication  to the  public.  The  paper  suggests  that  increased  openness
and  the  inclusion  of multiple  perspectives  and  ways  of knowing,  inspired  by  post-normal  science,  could
facilitate  more  careful  consideration  of  potential  social  implications.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an  open  access  article  under  the CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
A future “Smart Grid” is increasingly being embraced in energy
olicies as a promising future energy scenario. EU policy docu-
ents, for example, describe smart energy infrastructure as central
or addressing the societal challenge of transitioning to an energy-
fﬁcient low-carbon economy (e.g. [1] EC). New and emerging
nergy technologies are often accompanied by high hopes and
xpectations for the future (see e.g. [2] Skjølsvold), and the Smart
rid is no exception: Visions of a smart electricity grid promises
olutions for most current challenges in electricity production and
istribution, describing this as necessary technological progress,
hich will get us closer to a sustainable energy future. Jasanoff
nd Kim ([3,4]) highlight that the capacity to imagine futures is an
mportant element of social and political life, and use the concept of
sociotechnical imaginaries” to describe such collective visions of
esirable and feasible (technoscientiﬁc) futures. Through the lens
f this theoretical concept, the collective visions of the future Smart
rid in a Norwegian context will be critically analyzed and explored
∗ Corresponding author.
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/).license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
as sociotechnical energy imaginaries, based on empirical data from
interviews as well as documentary analysis.
Many countries are now introducing “smart” electricity meters,
which are considered to be the ﬁrst step of the journey in pur-
suing the captivating future energy scenario of the Smart Grid.
Smart meters allow for adding a “digital dimension” to the cur-
rent electricity grid, making new and detailed information available
by frequently and automatically measuring electricity consump-
tion. In Norway, smart meters are going to be introduced to all
households by 2019 ([5] NVE; [6] MPE), with very limited possi-
bilities of opting out ([7] NVE). The introduction process is based
on a regulatory framework determined by the national regulator
(NVE) and the operational responsibility for installing the smart
meters belongs to the network companies, which constitute a reg-
ulated monopoly. The cost of the smart meter investment will be
paid by the consumers, through an increase in the transmission
tariff; a fee paid to the network company by the end-users. This
tariff is set by each individual network company, but has to stay
within limits determined by the national regulator NVE ([8] NVE).
The introduction of smart meters was  initiated even though this
was not found to be socioeconomically beneﬁcial ([9] ECON). In the
empirical material for this paper, informants described how the
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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belief in a future” was decisive for this decision, which illustrates
hat the future imaginaries of the Smart Grid are performative.
A retrospecting study by Skjølsvold [2] describes a transfor-
ation of the imagined futures of ‘advanced electricity meters’
n Norway, since discussions about this new technology started
round 1998. During the ﬁrst period of discussions (1998–2003),
uture accounts of these meters worked as what Skjølsvold calls
stagesetting devices”, sustaining debate and enrolling new actors
n the debate. From around 2004, the future accounts took on a dif-
erent form of agency, becoming performative “regulative tools”;
ith an impact on present formulation of new regulations. This
as due to a gradual change in the understanding of what these
lectricity meters could become in the future, symbolically, prac-
ically, and cognitively: The meters went from being regarded as
elatively simple information devices, to being seen as a complex
ub of information, delivering an array of potential services which
ould restructure electricity consumption practices. Skjølsvold [2]
alls these performative future accounts “translative futures”. The
lectricity meters became “smart meters” and a ‘ﬁrst step’ of a larger
uture vision of the Smart Grid.
The transition to a future Smart Grid can be described as a
arge-scale technoscientiﬁc ﬁeld of innovation, requiring a phys-
cal, technological and social reconﬁguration of the entire energy
upply system. This entails potentially substantial consequences
or individual consumers and has comprehensive social implica-
ions. In many countries, grassroots resistance has emerged with
he introduction of smart meters, emphasizing concerns related
o privacy, security, health and costs.1 In Norway, smart meters
nd the future Smart Grid has not yet become a topic for broader
ublic or political debate2 (see also [10] Inderberg), and signs of
rassroots resistance have been minor.3 Part of the explanation for
he relative lack of debate seems to be that discussions regarding
he future Smart Grid and the introduction of smart meters mainly
re taking place within a network of actors with recognized exper-
ise, competence and knowledge. This can be conceptualized as a
echno-epistemic network.
The concept of techno-epistemic network originates from Haas’
11] notion of “epistemic community”. Haas’ ([11]: 3) deﬁnes an
pistemic community as “a network of professionals with rec-
gnized expertise and competence in a particular domain and
n authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that
omain or issue-area”. This notion is suitable for knowledge-
ntense contexts, for example, with knowledge workers united by a
hared set of normative and principled beliefs and practices. Rom-
etveit [12] has introduced the concept of ‘epistemic network’,
hich allows for a hybridity of roles and (professional) identities
cross science-policy boundaries, as well as more heterogeneity
nd porosity than the concept of epistemic community. In con-
exts of technoscientiﬁc innovation, such as the transitioning to
 future Smart Grid, such a network can be conceptualized as a
echno-epistemic network.
The members of a techno-epistemic network share a dedication
nd commitment for realizing a technoscientiﬁc innovation, related
1 See for example http://stopsmartmeters.org/, http://stopsmartmeters.com.au/
r http://stopsmartmeters.org.uk/.
2 The Norwegian Data Protection Agency stated in the media that the introduction
f  smart meters entails challenges for privacy, data storage and data protection.
eyond this, however, the topic has not been subject to much public or political
ebate.
3 Some grassroots resistance does exits, such as a Facebook group, two petitions
nd  a webpage. The webpage describes links to similar social movements in other
ountries. However, the extent of supporters of these initiatives ranges from just
38–344 members or signatures (as of June 29, 2015). There have also been examples
f  critical remarks from consumers in newspapers (see e.g. the newspaper Bergens
idende (BT), August 26, 2012; ‘ Lite smart for forbrukerne’).ial Science 9 (2015) 9–20
to a speciﬁc societal challenge. Following this, anyone responding
to or contesting a grand societal challenge, by engaging in innova-
tion activities with others, is in principle a potential member of a
techno-epistemic network. The network can have great diversity
(e.g. connecting domains such as law, politics, science or industry)
and include different constituent networks, for example at different
scales. Although commonly building on existing forms of exper-
tise, technologies and infrastructures, new relations can emerge
between different forms of relevant expertise across national, sec-
torial and disciplinary boundaries. Sociotechnical imaginaries, such
as the imaginaries of the future Smart Grid, can serve to guide and
coordinate action across different parts of a techno-epistemic net-
work. However, it remains an empirical question whether and to
what extent such a conceptualization is meaningful for networks
of actors in different contexts of technoscientiﬁc innovation ([13]
Rommetveit et al.). The informants for this study were part of the
techno-epistemic network of Smart Grids in Norway. This national
network is quite heterogenic and includes (but is not limited
to) actors working in network companies, industry organizations,
research organizations, technology development companies and
regulating- and political authorities.
Inderberg [10] describes that the driving forces behind the intro-
duction of smart meters in Norway were the energy sector, due
potential beneﬁts for the energy industry, as well as EU policies
and developments (see e.g. [1,14] EC). He argues that the process
of developing smart meter regulations included technical exper-
tise from the electricity sector, while consumer organizations had
quite limited inﬂuence. This argument resonates well with results
outlined in this paper; informants emphasized that technical pro-
fessionals should be consulted if decisions related to smart meters
were to be made,4 and the experts’ imaginaries of the future Smart
Grid mainly emphasize solutions for the energy industry for deal-
ing with current challenges in the energy supply system. However,
the communication to the public about the introduction of smart
meters and the future Smart Grid strongly emphasizes potential
beneﬁts for consumers. This could also be contributing to the lack of
public debate, since this communication does not include informa-
tion about uncertainties or potential social implications. Following
this, there is a gap between what is being communicated to the
public and the experts’ imaginaries of the future Smart Grid.
This paper argues that part of the reason why this gap exists, is
the way ‘consumers’ are being imagined or constructed. Placing
smart meters in individual households gives consumers a cen-
tral role in the future Smart Grid scenario, and hence perceptions
and assumptions about ‘consumers’, such as how consumers might
behave or what they might be willing to accept, are part of the imag-
inaries of the future Smart Grid (see also e.g. [15] Verbong et al.).
The concepts of ‘imagined publics’ and ‘imagined lay people’ (see e.g.
[16] Barnett et al.; [17] Walker et al.; [18] Welsh and Wynne; [2]
Skjølsvold) are drawn on in this paper on for discussing this con-
struction of consumers as part of these future imaginaries, and how
such imagined publics can be decisive for choices being made in the
process.
Collective technoscientiﬁc visions have better chances of
becoming widely shared if they allow for multiple interpreta-
tions ([19] Berkhout). While sociotechnical imaginaries of the
future Smart Grid often include some common characteristics, they
4 In Norwegian, the term “fagfolk” is used about technical professionals. An inci-
dent  referred to by several informants is when the Minister of Petroleum and Energy
suggested rolling out smart meters in the middle part of Norway sooner than the
deadline for the rest of the country (see also [21] Throndsen). The reason stated
was that this was a particularly weak supply area ([22] MPE). However, the pro-
posal was  never put into practice, due to resistance from the network companies.
Several informants emphasize that the politicians should have asked the technical
professionals before putting such a proposal forth.
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re also contextual, varying across scales and domains. Physical,
conomical, institutional and cultural dynamics (see e.g. [10] Inder-
erg; [15] Verbong et al.; [20] Verbong and Geels) or national
maginations ([3] Jasanoff and Kim) can be signiﬁcant for the con-
truction of imaginaries. Inderberg [10] argues that institutional
tructures, energy-source portfolio, degree of liberalization and
nterests have been signiﬁcant contextual factors for Norway’s
nergy policy on “advanced metering”.5 This call for a situating of
he future imaginaries of the Smart Grid in this speciﬁc national
ontext, as a backdrop for the description and discussion of these
maginaries:
Norway has extensive hydropower resources, and was con-
uming more electricity per inhabitant than any other population
n the world as early as in the 1920s. The industry started out
uite fragmented, with highly engaged local municipalities and a
arge degree of public ownership. However, developments towards
ational coordination, centralization and market-based trading
tarted taking form in the 1970s. The ﬁrst of many confrontations
etween energy state agencies and nature conservation lobbyists
lso occurred around this time6 ([23] Skjold). In the aftermath of
he oil crisis in 1973, policy-makers constructed ‘consumers’ as
conomic rational actors, but with a knowledge- and moral deﬁcit
[25] Karlstrøm et al.). Furthermore, energy policies called “energy
conomization”7 were introduced, rooted in ideas from economic
heory, with an emphasis on cost-efﬁciency, implying economically
ptimal energy consumption and production ([24] Skjølsvold et al.).
The fragmented local electricity distribution with a plethora of
mall and medium-sized providers, combined with state owner-
hip and control of the top level of the transmission grid, made
orway particularly well-suited for a transition to market trading.8
n 1991, a progressive power market reform was  launched, mak-
ng Norway one of the ﬁrst countries to establish a free market for
ower. In the years leading up to this reform, a majority of policy-
akers9 constructed ‘consumers’ as economic rational actors, and
he previous moral and knowledge deﬁcits were no longer empha-
ized ([25] Karlstrøm et al.). This pioneer liberalization process can
e seen as part of a broader shift towards increased free trade
haracterizing this period: European integration was  progressing
ith the establishment of an internal market well underway, with
oals of liberalizing electricity sectors in member countries and
romoting cross-national trade. Soon after, Norway also joined
he European Economic Area (EEA) and established the ﬁrst inter-
ational power exchange with Sweden, called ‘Nord Pool’ ([23]
kjold).
The energy sector is still a generator of strong sentiments of local
nvolvement and nature conservation,10 but has come a long way
ince its early days: Both the energy sector and the energy infras-
ructures are now highly centralized and institutionalized, with
5 As seen in Skjølsvold ([2]) retrospecting study, “smart meters” has mainly been
alled “advanced metering” or “advanced metering infrastructure” (AMI) in Norway.
6 Protests were related to a project in a place called Mardøla in 1970 and involved
ivil disobedience.
7 In Norwegian: “Energiøkonomisering” (ENØK).
8 It is a crucial condition for creating a power market that no single operator
hould own  or control the core transmission grid. The state owned the top level of
he transmission system through the state company Statkraft, established in 1986
o  manage the power production ([23] Skjold).
9 The majority was the center-right government. A minority opposition of policy-
akers (the Labour Party and Socialist Left Party) emphasized consumers’ right to
uy  electricity at a “reasonable” price ([25] Karlstrøm et al.).
10 A recent example is a conﬂict in Hardanger from 2005–2011, which got national
nd  international media attention. Plans for constructing new power lines over a
cenic fjord in Western Norway resulted in extensive public resistance and grass-
oots protests, emphasizing environmental perspectives. These power lines were
eferred to by the protesters as “monster” power lines (in Norwegian: “monster-
aster”).ial Science 9 (2015) 9–20 11
shared values, norms and regulations. The signiﬁcance of market
rationality has gradually increased, leading up to what nowadays
seems to be a widespread support for market logic. The construc-
tions of consumers as economic rational actors have in more recent
years been coupled with an emphasis on changing the technolog-
ical basis of households by subsidizing investments in preferred
energy technologies. This seems to be partly based on instances
where the prices of electricity have increased, but not resulting in
the desired changes in the electricity consumption of consumers.11
This emphasis on technology makes the moral deﬁcit of the 70s
irrelevant; it is no longer a goal to support thriftiness or reduce com-
fort ([25] Karlstrøm et al.). Yet, electricity savings now seem to be
more important than cost-efﬁciency for Norwegian consumers, due
to environmental concerns and values ([26] Karlsen and Ryghaug).
Climate and energy policies continue to be attuned to market
measures, rather than technology development or system trans-
formation ([27] Boasson). An example is the market-based green
certiﬁcate scheme established together with Sweden in 2010,
which encourages new production of renewable energy, ﬁnanced
by consumers through an increase in the electricity bill ([28] MPE;
[29] NVE). Arguably, an emphasis on market logic comes at the
expense of political governance and intervention ([23] Skjold).
Skjølsvold et al. [24] notes that Norway lacks a “grand narrative”
for the role of decentralized renewable energy and argue that the
dominance of market logic has left the governance of renewable
energy mainly in the hands of market participants, contributing
to a challenging situation for the implementation of new renew-
able energy technologies. Additionally, the centralized institutional
and technological structures could potentially impede the adoption
and diffusion of new decentralized renewable energy sources and
technologies ([30] Christiansen; [31] Wolsink).
The energy sector’s centralized and institutionalized character
also manifests itself to some extent in the introduction process of
smart meters. Throndsen [21] discusses some of the challenges
faced by the network companies when trying to make sense of
this major innovation and restructuring process. Even though the
energy industry was a driving force for the introduction of smart
meters ([10] Inderberg), the increased complexity with the trans-
formation of the imagined futures of this technology (see [2]
Skjølsvold) entails that the network companies now become inno-
vation actors ([21] Throndsen), which is quite far away from their
traditional role (see e.g. [32] Arends & Hendriks).
After outlining the methodology and theoretical concepts, the
imaginaries of the future Smart Grid and the imaginaries of ‘con-
sumers’ will be described and discussed. Following this, it is
suggested to move towards “closing the gap” between the current
communication to the public and the expert sociotechnical imag-
inaries. Inspired by the perspective of post-normal science (e.g.
[33–35] Funtowicz and Ravetz; [36,37] Ravetz), it is argued that
a more open, transparent and participative, or what Giddens [38]
would call ‘socially robust’, process could be beneﬁcial for address-
ing the complexity and uncertainty that characterizes this kind of
technoscientiﬁc innovation. Such an approach holds the potential
to increase democratic legitimacy and/or facilitate more careful
consideration of potential social implications.
2. Methods and dataThis study combined documentary analysis of policy and reg-
ulatory documents with in-depth semi-structured interviews.
11 In the winter of 2002–2003 there was a crisis of supply of electricity and hence
increased prices of electricity. This did not lead to signiﬁcant changes in the electric-
ity  consumption of consumers. Following this, the need to change the technological
basis of households was emphasized ([25] Karlstrøm et al.).
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ocuments related to science, technology and power, such as
ublic hearings, policy reports or national policies for regulation
f new technologies, can describe national visions of desirable
utures driven by science and technology and are useful for exam-
ning sociotechnical imaginaries ([39] Harvard STS Program; [3]
asanoff and Kim; [40] Jasanoff). Relevant documents were iden-
iﬁed through literature searches, ofﬁcial webpages and dialogue
ith informants. Documents identiﬁed included national and EU
olicy documents, national public hearings and an extensive num-
er of relevant reports. In addition, a total of 13 semi-structured
nterviews with 14 informants were conducted, each lasting for 1-
 hours. These were audio recorded, transcribed and coded by the
nterviewer. The interviews included quite broad and open initial
uestions, such as how the informant imagined the future electric-
ty grid.
Since discussions of smart meters and a future Smart Grid
ainly were taking place within the techno-epistemic network
f Smart Grids in Norway, this network was the starting point
or selecting interviewees. An initial mapping showed that this
etwork was relatively extensive, including for instance actors
orking with smart meters in about 140 network companies,
n national industry organizations, within regulating and polit-
cal authorities, and within companies and organizations doing
esearch, analysis and technology development. Hence, purposive
ampling based on the strategy of maximum variation was  used
[41] Bradshaw and Stratford), in order to get participants with
ifferent backgrounds and a variety of perspectives. It was  also a
riority to include participants with ﬁrsthand experience from pilot
rojects on smart meters or Smart Grids. This was  combined with
nowballing. The suggestions made by informants of other rele-
ant actors who could be potential interviewees also gave empirical
eight to the idea of conceptualizing these actors as a network.
The interviewees included 5 informants from 4 different
etwork companies, working speciﬁcally with Norwegian pilot
rojects and programs related to smart meters, 1 informant from
he industry organization Energy Norway, 1 informant from the
orwegian Smartgrid Centre, 2 informants from the Norwegian
ater Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), 1 informant work-
ng with research on Smart Grids for the grid operator Statnett, 2
nformants from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and 2 infor-
ants working with research on Smart Grids within SINTEF (an
ndependent and non-commercial research organization). There
as a majority of male informants (11 out of 13). This reﬂects that a
arge part of the national techno-epistemic network works within
he energy sector, which is a male dominated sector.12
Following Jasanoff and Kim [3] , language was seen as an impor-
ant medium for the construction of imaginaries and recurrent
iscursive elements were identiﬁed. When the world is envi-
ioned by actors who have the capacity to materialize such visions,
iscourses (or institutionalized modes of representation) can be
mportant, since imaginaries can be constrained by present and his-
orically produced conditions ([42] Smith: 463). The material was
oded using the program Atlas.ti; ﬁrst descriptively, based on key
opics for organization of the material, and then by analytical codes
f interpretive themes for analysis. This included ‘descriptions or
ramings of the future Smart Grid’ and ‘imaginations of the public’
or example. The analysis was attentive to scripting13 of issues and
ffects of truth. Describing imaginaries requires a generalization
12 The energy sector has had about 20% female employees since 2004 ([43] SSB).
13 Scripting refers to how actors construct stories or events as examples of a gen-
ral  pattern by referring to their routine character, or like the story or event is an
xception from a general and common pattern. This can give the impression that
n  event or action was  ‘unavoidable’ and therefore appropriate or acceptable ([44]
ilverman).ial Science 9 (2015) 9–20
of nuances: The majority of informants from network companies
and industry organizations used technical terminology to a larger
extent than the other informants, and the informants from the
authorities14 applied a larger degree of economic or neoliberal
terminology. Furthermore, the informants working as researchers
talked more about the social dimension of the Smart Grid than the
other informants.
3. Theoretical concepts: sociotechnical imaginaries and
imagined publics
Future visions and expectations for what is attainable through
science and technology are embedded in social organization and
practices, and almost always include implicit shared understand-
ings of what is considered to be ‘good’ or desirable; such as
what constitutes “public good” or a “good” society, or how sci-
ence and technology could meet public needs ([3] Jasanoff and
Kim). Commitments to such shared understandings can reconﬁg-
ure actors’ sense of possible spaces of action, as well as the sense
of rightness of action ([40] Jasanoff). The concept of sociotechnical
imaginaries was  coined by Jasanoff and Kim ([3]: 120), and can be
used to explore how actors’ produce future visions or imaginaries
that describe desirable and feasible futures. Studying imaginar-
ies entails being attentive to how they link past and future times,
enable or restrict actions in space, and naturalize ways of thinking
about possible worlds ([40] Jasanoff).
Sociotechnical imaginaries can be embedded in or produced by
a variety of individual or collective accounts of potential futures
across scales (see e.g. [40] Jasanoff; [42] Smith; [45] Pickersgill;
[46] Kuchler). Imaginaries can guide and coordinate action across
techno-epistemic networks ([13] Rommetveit et al.), establish the
need for political decisions, justify new investments in science and
technology, promote certain technological pathways or justify the
inclusion or exclusion of citizens. Following this, imaginaries can
have a performative dimension, taking on a form of agency which
can shape the present ([40] Jasanoff; [2] Skjølsvold). Future imagi-
naries are not a neutral construct; they are framed in a certain way,
and some aspects are included while other aspects are being left
out ([2] Skjølsvold). Some actors have more power than others to
project their imaginations ([47] Harvard STS Program).
We can also learn about future imaginaries by turning to the
related strand of literature called the ‘sociology of expectation’. This
literature studies the informal production and circulation of expec-
tations of science and technology, including how such expectations
are structured, how they grow or deteriorate, and how they can
affect decision-making processes ([48] van Lente; [49] Borup et al.).
Part of this literature explores collective expectations or visions of
future possibilities of technoscience, and is hence closely related
to the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries. For instance, this lit-
erature shows how expectations of a promising technoscientiﬁc
future can raise attention or legitimize investments ([49] Borup
et al.), transcend uncertainty by providing direction in complex
contexts ([50] Rip and Kemp) or have a coordinating effect within
networks of technological development, serving to mediate across
boundaries of different domains and scales ([49] Borup et al.; [51]
Konrad). It is also highlighted that early technological expectations
can be technologically deterministic, downplaying organizational
and cultural factors ([49] Borup et al.), and how overarching visions
can face contestation when more speciﬁc projects take form ([52]
Eames et al.).
In their discussions of sociotechnical imaginaries, Jasanoff and
Kim ([3]: 142) include expert’s perceptions of the public. In this
14 This includes informants from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and from
the  Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE).
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not much leeway for introducing solutions that would be “speciﬁc
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aper, such perceptions of the public are conceptualized as con-
tructed or imagined publics. Literature on imagined publics has
ypically dealt with the relationship between publics on the one
and and science, policy and technology development on the other
and ([16] Barnett et al.; [18] Welsh and Wynne). Perceptions
r imaginaries of an anticipated ‘public’ can be invoked for var-
ous purposes within technical, industrial and policy networks
[17] Walker et al.; [2] Skjølsvold; [25] Karlstrøm et al.). Imagined
ublics or “imagined lay persons” can be given agency in processes
f sociotechnical change and be present at key decision-making
oints in evolving trajectories of technology development, which
an be essential for the framing of lay-expert interactions ([17]
alker et al.; [53] Maranta et al.). Barnett et al. [16], for exam-
le, found that preferences for public engagement mechanisms
ften were a function of the speciﬁc characteristics attributed to
magined publics. The “energy consumer” is an integrated part of
he imaginaries for the future Smart Grid, often constructed as a
ational Resource Man, who is intended to both realize and sig-
iﬁcantly beneﬁt from this sociotechnical change ([54] Strengers).
deal expectations of future users and their attributes can even be
iterally and materially scripted into technologies and sociotechni-
al systems (see e.g. [55] Woolgar; [56] Akrich; [57] Carlson; [58]
atour; [49] Borup et al.).
. Results and discussion: sociotechnical imaginaries of the
uture Smart Grid
This section will explore the expert imaginaries of the future
mart Grid, from within the national techno-epistemic network.
his includes descriptions of perceived current challenges for the
nergy supply system, as well as how the future Smart Grid
rovides solutions to these challenges. Furthermore, it includes
escriptions of how the public or ‘consumers’ are constructed
ithin these future imaginaries and the way this construction of
onsumers underpin some of the choices being made in this process
f sociotechnical change.
.1. Solving current challenges: security of supply and integration
f decentralized renewables
The imaginaries of the future Smart Grid seems to be closely
inked to security of supply.  Simply put; a relatively secure energy
upply means having few black-outs and quite reliable energy pro-
uction that can match the demand at all times. Several informants
escribe how Norwegian society is becoming increasingly depen-
ent on constant access to electricity. A frequently used example
s the cold winter months and how many households rely on elec-
ricity for heating:
You could tolerate a blackout in 1955, when almost everyone
had a wood stove, more easily than you can tolerate it today. The
requirements for the quality and security of delivery are much
higher today than they were back then, and this is constantly
developing, in accordance with the needs of society.
Smart meters/Grids expert working in the industry organization.
Following this, security of supply is singled out by several infor-
ants as the most important task for the network companies. The
ompanies also get ﬁnancial penalties if a long-lasting black-out
ccurs. An illustration of the importance of this aspect is how sev-
ral informants describe that the security of supply in Norway as
urrently being over 99 percent, with just marginal uncertainty.
he surroundings of the grid, such as nature and weather (see for
xample [59] Statnett) are described as a main source of uncertainty
nd hence a potential source of errors in the grid. Smart meters areial Science 9 (2015) 9–20 13
considered to be a useful tool for dealing with such uncertainty in
the security of supply:
The power supply system must be as secure as possible. At the
same time, we have to add requirements for ﬁnancial efﬁciency.
You know, a 100 percent security of delivery would be way
too expensive. But we are high above 99 (. . .)  getting those last
tenths would be disproportionally expensive, because it means
that there should not be an outage during a thunderstorm (. . .)
But if that happens, AMI  [red: Advanced Metering Infrastruc-
ture] makes it easier to handle it.
Smart meters/Grids expert working in the industry organization.
Informants also describe how detecting such errors currently is a
manual process, but that they can be detected and dealt with faster
by using the smart meters. Some envision that this will become a
completely automated process in the future, which is sometimes
referred to as the Smart Grid being a “self-healing grid”:
With regards to Smart Grid, one of the visions is what is called
(. . .)  a self-healing grid. This means that the grid, when some-
thing breaks, it manages to isolate the error by itself. So just
the failing part will be disabled; the rest is switched back on,
without any people out there working in the ﬁeld. It happens
automatically.
Smart meters/Grids expert working in a large network company.
The introduction of smart meters is also described as part of a
development towards a tighter integration and interdependence
of European countries with regards to electricity, as a result of an
expected future expansion of renewable energy production and an
increasingly more integrated European energy market. This is con-
tradictory, however, to the emphasis on security of supply, which
is described as a national interest and concern:
The alternative [red: to increasing the proportion of renewable
energy sources] for Germany is to buy energy from other coun-
tries, and that has some different aspects to it: You do not trust
everyone equally (. . .)  and if you do trust your neighbor a lot, you
still know that if there is a crisis, and he has to choose between
himself and you. . . Not everyone would share ﬁfty–ﬁfty in that
scenario, even if you guys were good friends. And that’s the way
it is internationally as well, every country needs to have control
of their energy supply, in order to have security of supply.
Smart meters/Grids expert working in industry organization.
Due to Norway’s extensive hydropower, the country does not
have to rely on decentralized renewables in order to have a national
energy supply based on renewable energy. Following this, intro-
ducing smart meters is described as being less critical for Norway
than for most other European countries. However, it is still empha-
sized that the Norwegian energy supply system is “connected to
Europe”, both through physical infrastructure and through the
European energy market. Some informants express that Norway
needs to adapt to all EU requirements for smart meters, since this
could be necessary for participating in the European electricity
market. Some potential functionalities of the smart meter are also
considered by informants as “obvious” functionalities, with ref-for Norway”, and specifying national smart meter requirements
15 In Norwegian: “Særnorske løsninger”.
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s considered almost unnecessary (see e.g. [60] THEMA). Compar-
sons are also made with smart meter processes in other European
ountries; especially of “how smart” the smart meters are in other
ountries. It is emphasized that it is important to be “at the fore-
ront” in Europe, avoiding “primitive” technological solutions. As
utlined earlier, Norway was also what we can call a “European
rontrunner” in liberalizing the energy sector and establishing an
nternational power trade (Nord Pool), so this is not a new idea. This
tudy does not explore further why this aspect is emphasized. How-
ver, one could speculate whether this might be considered a way  of
etting increased inﬂuence on European agendas, despite Norway’s
eographical location a bit on the outskirts of central Europe, and
ot being a member state of the EU. There are frequent references
o Norway as the “green battery” of Europe, and that Norwegian
ydropower can serve as balancing power for Europe:16
Being able to release Norwegian ﬂexibility in the production
system, which can be sold abroad to a much higher price (. . .)
This can be offered to a European market, which screams after
that kind of capacity. (. . .)  AMI  [red: Advanced Metering Infras-
tructure] (. . .)  contributes, so Norway can sell this regulatory
capacity.
Smart meters/Grids expert working in the industry organization.
This illustrates how the imaginaries of the future Smart Grid
artly are permeated by national imaginations; Norway is con-
idered to be a green battery and is also sometimes described
s a “green energy nation” due to its hydropower (despite its
arge petroleum sector17). Realizing this green battery vision, how-
ver, would require massive investments in transmission cables to
urope ([24] Skjølsvold et al.).
The focus on Norway already being “green” also seems to imply
hat increasing decentralized renewables would be somewhat
uperﬂuous, which could be a barrier for an expansion of renewable
nergy production. Some informants highlight that decentralized
nergy production is unreliable, because of ﬂuctuations in weather
onditions. However, many informants expect a certain increase
n decentralized renewable energy production due to the marked-
ased green certiﬁcate scheme for renewable energy. The smart
eters are seen as crucial for connecting such decentralized renew-
ble energy production to the grid. This is sometimes referred to as
 “paradigm shift”, going from today’s centralized one-way pro-
uction and distribution of electricity, to a two-way production
nd distribution. It is also envisioned that the future grid would
e able to automatically connect or disconnect such decentralized
nergy production, depending on the demand at any given time.
his is sometimes described as a way of reducing or eliminating
the risk of human error”. This kind of increased automation due
o utilization of information from the smart meters is often what
s referred to in descriptions of how the future Smart Grid will be
more intelligent”.
The idea of consumers becoming ‘prosumers’, producing elec-
ricity in their own households or communities and possibly
ending excess electricity back to the grid, seems to often be a
entral aspect of visions of a future Smart Grid. In the Norwegian
ontext, however, this is often not included as part of the the future
maginaries. When asked about prosumers, some informants high-
ight the technical difﬁculties with connecting renewable energy
roduction from prosumers to the grid. It is also highlighted that
16 The ‘green battery’ is a multi-faceted idea (see e.g. [61] Gullberg). This aspect was
he  only dimension of the ‘green battery’ highlighted by informants in this study.
17 About 30 percent of the national budget came from the petroleum sector in
012, for example ([62] MPE).ial Science 9 (2015) 9–20
this could add to the workload for the network companiesl; the
companies might have to assist consumers, due to consumers’ lack
of necessary knowledge and expertise. Some informants explain
that they do not think many consumers would want to become pro-
sumers, with references to surveys which conclude that electricity
is a low-interest product. In the few instances when prosumers
are included in descriptions of the future Smart Grid, ﬁnancial
incentives are strongly emphasized as a necessary precondition.
Hence, consumers are being constructed as economic actors, with
a knowledge deﬁcit as well as an engagement deﬁcit. Part of the
explanation for this might be the centralized institutional struc-
tures of the energy sector: Considering the smart meter as a way of
advancing renewable energy applications through increasing the
autonomy of end-users does not necessarily ﬁt with current tech-
nological and institutional structures (see also [30] Christiansen;
[31] Wolsink). Some studies also suggest that Smart Grid stake-
holders might assume that current structures and division of tasks
between actors will remain more or less the same in the future ([15]
Verbong et al.; [10] Inderberg).
This section has highlighted how national interests and imag-
inations are signiﬁcant for the construction of imaginaries of the
future Smart Grid, with national security of supply being strongly
emphasized. The Smart Grid imaginaries also entail an increased
interdependence between other countries, but this is less of a con-
cern in the Norwegian context due to the extensive hydropower.
However, this might be a barrier for a realization of the Smart
Grid vision in other national contexts. It is also evident that the
future Smart Grid is a technological vision: Avoiding “primitive”
technological solutions is emphasized and technology is seen as
providing the grid with intelligence, while humans sometimes are
seen as a source of unwanted errors. Technology is also considered
to be a tool for combating uncertainty which could potentially cause
errors, such as uncertainty caused by nature or weather. The idea
that technology can provide control over nature reﬂects tendencies
of technological optimism. However, early technological expecta-
tions can be technologically deterministic ([49] Borup et al.). Lastly,
the potential for consumers to become ‘prosumers’ is generally not
included as part of the future imaginaries. This could be related to
the centralized institutional structures of the energy sector, as well
as the way consumers are being constructed; as economic actors
with a knowledge deﬁcit and an engagement deﬁcit.
4.2. Solving current challenges: peak demand and increase in EVs
In line with the emphasis on national security of supply, the
importance of investments for maintaining and upgrading the elec-
tricity grid is frequently mentioned. The dimensioning of the grid
has to be on a par with what is called ‘peak demand’. This con-
cept refers to the times when the overall electricity consumption is
high and the demand hence reaches a “peak”. Informants describe
how the overall electricity consumption and peak demand follows
certain patterns during the day in line with everyday social and cul-
tural practices. Several informants use the analogy of rush hour on
a freeway to explain how peak demand is decisive for the dimen-
sioning of the grid and grid investments: In the electricity grid,
there cannot be a queue during “rush hours”. Hence, it is neces-
sary to build enough “lanes”, through grid investments, to avoid
any queue. A frequently mentioned concern is an expected future
increase in the number of electric vehicles (EVs) due to Norway’s
generous subsidy policy18, and in fast chargers for these EVs. This is
considered to increase the challenge of peak demand in the future:
18 Norway has quite a generous support and subsidy policy for EVs, consisting of
a  tax exemption package and driving and ﬁnancial privileges, which has gradually
been implemented in the last 10–15 years. The sales of EVs has increased over the
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Using an electrical vehicle does not mean using less energy. (. . .)
This consumption will come in addition to the consumption we
have today. (. . .)  It is a different kind of consumption. When you
recharge an electrical vehicle, you suddenly need large amounts
of energy and if the electrical vehicle is going to have a future,
you cannot wait a day to recharge (. . .).  This means that you
suddenly have the need to move large amount of energy very
quickly, which means you get fast chargers (. . .).  You get a whole
new situation in the grid, if this becomes dominating.
Smart meters/Grids expert working in a large network company.
The future Smart Grid is considered to make it possible to
ostpone or reduce costly investments in grid infrastructure. The
requent smart meter measurements of electricity consumption in
ouseholds enable market-based pricing of electricity, and thereby
lso new market mechanisms and incentives for consumers. This
s referred to by informants as “establishing a demand-response
egime”, and it is seen as a signiﬁcant change from the current
stimated stipulation of prices. With pricing based on market ﬂuc-
uations, electricity will become more expensive during periods
f high demand. With the demand-response regime, consumers
ill have access to price information, and hence be able to change
heir consumption patterns in line with variations in energy prices.
his is sometimes referred to as “peak shifting” by “applying con-
umer ﬂexibility”. Many describe this as a possible solution for the
hallenge of the expected future increase in EVs, since price sig-
als might encourage consumers to charge EVs during the night,
or example, and possibly discourage frequent use of fast chargers.
articipation in the market and the opportunity to adapt to price
ignals is seen as an advantage for consumers. Several informants
oint out that consumers currently do not pay enough attention
o electricity prices in everyday electricity consumption, as well
s when choosing an electricity provider. The demand-response
egime is hence seen as a way of ensuring a well-functioning
arket for electricity production. In this context, consumers are
onstructed as economic rational actors, but with an engage-
ent deﬁcit. The measures used for achieving behavior change are
ainly ﬁnancial incentives. Verbong et al. [15] describe how empir-
cal evidence of the potential of ﬁnancial stimuli is mixed, and that
 variety of variables can inﬂuence residential energy consumption,
uch as daily routines, individual preferences, social relations in a
ousehold or the way a technology is embedded in daily practices.
urthermore, as we have seen, environmental values seem to be of
mportance to Norwegian consumers ([26] Karlsen and Ryghaug).
The current requirements for smart meters in Norway is to
ave hourly measurements, with functionality for increasing this
o measurements every 15th minutes ([7] NVE). However, many
nformants express expectations of even more frequent measure-
ents in the future and some mention the possibility of real-time
easurements. A higher frequency of measurement is usually char-
cterized as “technologically more advanced”, and hence a better
ption for being “at the forefront” and for avoiding future reinvest-
ents. Smart meters that have been introduced in other countries
ith a relatively low frequency of measurements are referred to as
primitive”, or even “turtle” solutions (Sweden and Italy being com-
only used examples). Frequent measurements give more detailed
nformation and thereby increased control of the energy supply
ystem. However, as the Norwegian Data Protection Agency has
ointed out, this increased control, through more surveillance of
he grid, also entails increased surveillance of activities inside indi-
idual private households. So the increased control comes at the
ast few years; from 1,4 percent of the new car sales in 2011, increasing to 5,5 percent
n  2013, for example ([63] Holtsmark & Skonhoft).ial Science 9 (2015) 9–20 15
expense of privacy. This is mainly described as a technical issue,
which will be dealt with at a later stage.
“Consumer ﬂexibility” is a key concept that illustrates the cen-
tral role of consumers in the imaginaries of the future Smart Grid. It
is often stated that consumers should contribute to the energy sup-
ply system by “proving ﬂexibility”. This entails what is referred to as
having a “more correct” consumption proﬁle; electricity consump-
tion in line with the marked-based price signals. It is emhasized
that consumers mainly will be focused on advantages for them-
selves as individuals, and hence they would not understand “the
big picture” of the importance of security of supply for the society
as a whole. Consumers’ economic rationality and lack of knowledge
is perceived as an impediment for an understanding of the “public
good”:
The lack of understanding of the beneﬁts of grid investments
is an important factor which delays and, in the worst case,
results in abandonment of socioeconomically desirable grid
investments. It is therefore a need to increase the knowledge
about the value of the grid in the public space ([64] THEMA: 96).
Due to the combination of low electricity prices and relatively
high salaries in Norway, many informants express doubts as to
whether consumers actually would change their electricity con-
sumption patterns based on the information from price signals,
because the ﬁnancial incentives would not be substantial enough.
Some informants describe how the consumers are “spoiled” with
cheap electricity prices. Following this, it is emphasized that the
introduction of price tariffs will be necessary, in order to amplify the
ﬁnancial incentives considerably and possibly achieve the desired
behavioral changes:
It will still be voluntary. But it will require an effort from you.
(. . .)  Then maybe someone will ﬁnd out that boiling rice is
cheaper than boiling potatoes, right? Because it takes ﬁfteen
minutes instead of half an hour, you can get that kind of effects.
Smart meters/Grids expert working in a large network company.
Such an interference in people’s everyday habits in their pri-
vate homes through the use of ﬁnancial incentives, could also be
considered a reduction of the privacy or freedom in homes. The
concept of ‘consumer ﬂexibility’ entails a commodiﬁcation of indi-
vidual behavior in households: ‘Flexibility’ in individual behavior
can be “offered” by consumers in exchange for economic bene-
ﬁts and then be “applied” by network companies. However, this
is not necessarily a fair trade; different households will have vari-
ous ﬁnancial situations, and ﬁnancial incentives and price tariffs as
a means to achieve desired behavior change will hit some house-
holds harder than others. Financially vulnerable households might
not have the choice of “offering ﬂexibility”, but rather feel forced
to adapt. One informant describes that it is a challenging situation
already for some ﬁnancially vulnerable households during winters
with high prices:
We  know that in those years, for example in 2010, when the
price was very high, like in January and February. There are
some older people, for example, who use almost no electric-
ity at all, and get pneumonia. (. . .)  Almost every year, someone
dies because they have not paid the electricity bill, and they
[red: the network company] turn off the electricity. There are
some tragedies every year. So some people do care about the
electricity bill.Smart meters/Grids expert working in a large network company.
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Following this, the interest or engagement deﬁcit in the con-
truction of consumers seems to not necessarily apply to the
nancially vulnerable households. However, this topic seems, to
ome degree, to be silenced19 and hence it is not discussed much.
ome informants point out how ﬁxed-price options for ﬁnancially
ulnerable households would result in a less well-functioning mar-
et, and some highlight that this aspect will be dealt with at a later
tage.
This section has shown how the future Smart Grid is character-
zed by economic rationality, which is in line with the gradually
rowing signiﬁcance of market logic in the Norwegian energy
ector. “Consumer ﬂexibility” is considered to be a central tool
or reducing peak demand and for meeting the challenge of an
xpected future increase in EVs. This gives consumers a central
ole in the imaginaries of the Smart Grid, but consumers are con-
tructed as economic rational actors with an engagement deﬁcit.
n emphasis on technologically advanced smart meters which gen-
rates detailed information has implications for privacy. However,
his is often reduced to being seen as a technical issue. Furthermore,
he aspect of how this will affect ﬁnancially vulnerable households,
s to some extent silenced. These two examples of social implica-
ions that are not being adequately addressed illustrate the need
or including a broader range of expertise and perspectives beyond
he current network of energy experts in this sociotechnical innova-
ion process, thereby possibly becoming more sensitive to potential
ocial implications ([38] Giddens; [34,66] Funtowicz and Ravetz).
.3. Automating the home: Consumer ﬂexibility without
onsumers?
The smart meter is also seen as central for instrumenting the
ome, and for a development towards Smart Homes. Increased
utomation in households is expected to make it easier for con-
umers to change their consumption patterns. “Smart” appliances
re expected to become more common. Informants describe that it
s expected that such appliances will be possible to turn on or off
utomatically through the smart meter, in accordance with price
hanges and the overall demand for electricity:
You need to instrument your house. (. . .)  If you get the brain
[the smart meter] in, it is easy to instrument it. Because it will
recognize everything (. . .), like sensors and be able to get things
started, services and so on.
Smart meters/Grids expert working in a medium-sized network
company.
This reﬂects a construction of consumers which includes an
ngagement deﬁcit and a continuation of the descriptions of Karl-
trøm et al. [25] of the introduction of policies emphasizing the
eed for changing the technological basis of households. It is imag-
ned that smart appliances, or certain elements of the Smart Home,
lso could be remotely steered and controlled by external actors.
s examples of such external actors, informants mentioned the
etwork companies as well as actors within a new market of
upplementary services, which is expected to emerge. Some also
ighlighted that using such supplementary services usually would
ntail sharing personal smart meter data with third-party actors.
he conceptualization of homes as ‘Smart Homes’ and the possi-
ility of external steering makes the border line between public
nergy infrastructure and private homes more blurry, which call for
19 In discourse analysis, silence refers to how frameworks of understanding always
onceal as much as they reveal about the world. Identifying silences is an integral
art of discourse analysis ([65] Waitt: 236).ial Science 9 (2015) 9–20
considering the implications of such a change for the privacy of
the home. However, in a study from the Netherlands, it is consid-
ered unlikely that end-users would trust an external party to have
control over home appliances (Verbong et al. [15]).
Thermal loads, such as domestic hot water cylinders or heat-
ing in ﬂoors, are often highlighted with regards to remote steering.
Informants explain that such loads could be turned off for some
time without considerable change being noticed in the household.
There is some concern, however, related to the risk of not being
able to remotely switch the thermal loads back on after they have
been remotely switched off. This functionality has proved to be
challenging in demo tests. However, many informants emphasize
that technology will develop fast and probably solve this issue later
on. Furthermore, it is often highlighted that EVs could be used
for increasing ﬂexibility, by using the batteries in the vehicles for
energy storage and also making this ﬂexibility available for remote
steering by external actors. Even though several informants explain
that this possibility of using EV batteries as storage capacity is not
available or economically feasible yet (see also [31] Wolsink), it is
again emphasized that technology will develop fast and provide
solutions. There are differing views on whether or not some form
of consent from individuals would be needed for doing such remote
steering. It is also envisioned that external steering of consumption
in households could be made mandatory by the authorities in the
future.
A switch will be installed as part of the smart meter roll out in
Norway ([7] NVE), making it possible to remotely shut down the
electricity in a household. It is emphasized by several informants
that this switch is an EU requirement, and hence a necessary func-
tionality. There are, however, different perspectives on the switch
functionality: Many describe that it will be useful for remotely
turning off electricity when someone moves from one house to
a new one, which today is done manually. Another aspect high-
lighted is that the switch will be useful for cases where customers
have not paid their electricity bills and the electricity hence needs
to be turned off. The personal safety for the employees who  have
the job of manually turning off the electricity in such situations is
mentioned as a concern, which in the worst cases can experience
being threatened. Some informants express concerns, however,
such as the possibility of hackers getting control of this functional-
ity and hence being able to turn off the electricity in households or
whole neighborhoods. A related concern is unauthorized access to
personal smart meter data through hacking. Another potential chal-
lenge outlined is the risk of turning off health-related equipment in
homes which might need electricity to function. Another perspec-
tive is the idea that access to a minimum of electricity should be
a right for everyone, regardless of whether the electricity bills are
being paid, especially since some households rely on electricity for
heating:
(. . .)  Even if you cannot pay the bills, you should be entitled
to get enough electricity delivered to have light and heating,
at least in one room in the residence, right. So that you do not
freeze to death and so it is not dark.
Smart meters/Grids expert working in a large network company.
This section has described imaginaries of the future instru-
mented Smart Home, which is expected to make it easier to achieve
desired changes in electricity consumption patterns. The construc-
tions of consumers include an engagement deﬁcit. Furthermore, it
is imagined that Smart Homes partly could be externally steered,
which can be seen as a way of getting closer to the goal of
“peak shifting” without actively engaged consumers. This potential
for external steering makes the border line between the pub-
lic energy infrastructure and private homes more blurry. Some
I.F. Ballo / Energy Research & Social Science 9 (2015) 9–20 17
Table  1
Comparison of the communication to the public and the future imaginaries of the Smart Grid within the techno-epistemic network.
(1) Communication to the public (2) Future imaginaries of the techno-epistemic network
(i) Customers will get a more correct invoice and
not have to manually send in data about their
electricity consumption. Today, the invoice is
based on stipulated data, but with the smart
meters in place, more accurate data will be
available.
With regards to automatic measurements and smart meter data, the
importance of enabling a demand-response regime and consumer
ﬂexibility is emphasized. The beneﬁts for consumers of automatic
measurements are described as being of marginal importance. Some
hightlight that a more correct invoice as a result of the smart meters
potentially can improve the relationship between the network
companies and their customers: Firstly, because the data no longer
would be stipulated. Secondly,some point out that the customers only
would get one invoice, which would include the costs of both the
transmission tariff and of their electricity consumption. Increases in
the  transmission tariff are often contested and causing public debate.
The new invoice is expected to make the transmission tariff “less
visible” for consumers. Increases in this tariff are often contested and
causing public debate.
(ii) The information becoming available about
electricity consumption will enable the
network companies to assist customers in a
better way, if they have any complaints or
questions regarding their invoice.
One informant explains that complaints about the quality of delivery
of  electricity today often give an outcome in favor of the customer and
hence result in a monetary compensation from the network company.
It  is pointed out that it would be a beneﬁt for the network companies
to be able to check the validity of complaints by using the data from
smart meters. Following this, more complaints might get dismissed.
(iii) The customers will be able to reduce their
electricity bill by changing their consumption
patterns.
The potential for customers to save money on their electricity bill is
generally not considered to be very signiﬁcant:
“(. . .) maybe you can treat yourself with four or ﬁve extra
lager beers a year, for the money you save, and this can
contribute to changing attitudes.”
Smart meters/Grids expert working in a large network company
It is expected that price tariffs will be introduced, which entails
stronger incentives for changing consumption patterns in the future.
(iv) Consumers can use the new information
available to reduce their overall electricity
consumption, which is beneﬁcial for the
environment.
The main emphasis in the future imaginaries is not to reduce the total
electricity consumption, but rather to reduce “peak demand” in order
to achieve an more balanced electricity consumption overall during
the day. “Consumer ﬂexibility” and “peak shifting” is seen as central
for achieving this. Environmental aspects are less emphasized:
“AMI [Advanced Metering Infrastructure] has not been
developed because of environmental aspects. (. . .)  AMI  has
not been made with the intention of making us more
environmentally aware.”
Smart meters/Grids expert working in a large network company
Some informants point out that encouraging the public to use less
electricity than they do today would be an unpopular message to
communicate, both for politicians and for representatives from the
energy sector.
(v) It will be easier for the consumers to change
their supplier of electricity.
This is also included in the imaginaries of the Smart Grid, but it is not
emphasized that this is a beneﬁt for consumers. It is seen as important
in order to ensure a well-functioning market for electricity production.
(vi) The consumers can produce their own
electricity and earn a proﬁt from selling the
It is usually considered to be rather unlikely that it will become
widespread to produce electricity in households, due to a lack of
p
t
s
a
h
t
m
h
p
a
p
4
i
i
attempt of achieving public acceptance of smart meters. Many
informants describe previous experiences of trying to get pub-
lic acceptance for necessary grid infrastructure investments assurplus energy, becoming what is called a
“prosumers”. This can expand Norway’s
renewable energy production.
otential challenges of this functionality are being discussed within
he techno-epistemic network, including whether the external
teering will work as planned and the possibility of unauthorized
ccess to the steering/control or to smart meter data through
acking. To a large degree, such potential challenges are seen as
echnical issues and there are tendencies of technological opti-
ism,  with an emphasis on new technology providing solutions. As
ave been suggested earlier in this paper, these tendencies could
ossibly be counteracted by including a wider range of expertise
nd perspectives in the decision-making process, inspired by a
ost-normal approach (e.g. [34] Funtowicz and Ravetz).
.4. Communication to an imagined publicAs we have seen, the main emphasis in the future imaginar-
es of the Smart Grid is on potential solutions for the energy
ndustry to current challenges in the energy supply system. Theexpertise and engagement. When this is included as part of the future
imaginaries of the Smart Grid, the need for ﬁnancial incentives is
emphasized.
communication to the public, however, emphasizes the potential
advantages for individual consumers. Table 1 illustrates this gap
between the imaginaries of the techno-epistemic network and the
communication to the public.20 Preferences for public engagement
can be a function of characteristics attributed to imagined publics
([16] Barnett et al.). The communication emphasizing beneﬁts for
consumers seems to reﬂect the construction of “consumers” as eco-
nomic actors who  would be focused on individual beneﬁts.
The communication to the public could hence be seen an20 The ﬁrst column was constructed based on a summarizing of documents,
brochures and webpages with communication to the public related to the on-going
introduction of smart meters. The second column was  constructed based on the
interview data with informants from the techno-epistemic network.
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hallenging. Previous public debates related to increases in the
ransmission tariff that end-users in pay to the network company
because of grid investments) is highlighted, as well as recent
rotests against the construction of power lines in the Hardan-
er area in Norway.21 The costs for introducing smart meters
ill be covered through an increase in the transmission tariff ([5]
VE), so some of the informants express concerns about whether
he customers will understand how the beneﬁts of the smart
eters legitimizes the increased cost. Grassroots’ resistance has not
merged so far in Norway, but some informants mention protests
hat have happened in other countries when smart meters have
een introduced.
The grassroots resistance that has occurred in other countries
an provide us with important lessons with regards to public accep-
ance of smart meters, which also go beyond cost-related issues.
n the Netherlands, for example, the introduction of smart meters
as met  with resistance. This was mainly due to privacy issues
s well as a lack of democratic legitimacy, since decision-making
o a large extent happened behind closed doors. Lessons learned
rom this case could include a need for open and transparent com-
unication, and inclusion of a variety of interests and perspectives
[67] Cuijpers and Koops; [68] Hoenkamp et al.). Hess [69] describes
hat the development of strong communication and outreach pro-
rams has been part of the standard policy responses to opposition
gainst smart meters in the US. However, he suggests seeing the
ublic opposition as an opportunity to develop innovations in sys-
em design that could reduce conﬂict in a long-term perspective,
ather than aiming to “educate” consumers based on assumptions
f knowledge deﬁcits.
Parallels can also be drawn between the ‘imagined public’ in
his case study and Wynne’s ([70,71]) descriptions of implicit deﬁcit
odels of the public and assumptions about ‘typical publics’, which
an structure scientiﬁc discourses. Wynne ([71]: 220) emphasizes
ow institutions can cultivate their own trustworthiness by being
elf-reﬂexive with regards to their own assumptions. This could
ontribute to making normative assumptions or commitments
ore explicit, and hence to opening them up for open examination
nd debate (see also [18] Welsh & Wynne). Giddens [38] points out
hat this kind of openness cannot simply be seen as an exercise for
ommunication experts, but should be broadly encouraged and rec-
gnized institutionally. Opening up the decision-making process to
ther actors with a variety of interests and perspectives, could be
ne way of potentially democrating and strengthening the legiti-
acy of this technoscientiﬁc innovation process (inspired by e.g.
34,66] Funtowicz and Ravetz; [72] Frame and Brown). This calls
or moving towards “closing the gap”, between the sociotechnical
maginaries of the future Smart Grid and the communication to
he public, by facilitating broad dialogue and debate which could
ontribute to more careful consideration of social implications.
. Conclusion
A national techno-epistemic network is in the driver’s seat
f process of comprehensive sociotechnical innovation towards
 future Smart Grid, entailing physical, technological and social
econﬁguration of the energy supply system. The performative
uture imaginaries of the Smart Grid are partly permeated by
ational imaginations and are to a large extent technological and
conomical; entailing on increased surveillance of the grid and
tilization of new data. With discussions to a large extent being
ontained within the techno-epistemic network, and communi-
ation to the public strongly emphasizing potential beneﬁts for
21 See footnote 10 in the introduction.ial Science 9 (2015) 9–20
consumers, this radical transformation is now gradually starting
to take form without public debate.
The future imaginaries of the Smart Grid is based on the nar-
rative voices of the techno-epistemic network, providing solutions
which reﬂect current institutional and technological structures and
keep these structures relatively intact. The Smart Grid is described
as a necessity for technological progress, enabling increased
automation and control of the grid. The future imaginaries include
some techno-optimist tendencies, such as ideas of technology pro-
viding control over uncertainties caused by nature, as well as
providing “intelligence”, and solving potentially challenging social
issues. Furthermore, the Smart Grid energy imaginaries are under-
pinned by market logic, which has been a signiﬁcant characteristic
of the Norwegian energy sector the last few decades. This is encap-
sulated in the concept of “consumer ﬂexibility”, which entails a
commodiﬁcation of individual behavior in households. The future
Smart Grid provides increased control of the energy supply system
for the energy sector through increased ﬂexibility from consumers.
The gap between the future imaginaries of the techno-epistemic
network and the communication to the public seems to partly be
based on the way consumers are being constructed within the
techno-epistemic network. Imaginaries of consumers as economic
rational actors can be traced back to the early 70s in Norway
and are still prevailing. The use of ﬁnancial incentives in order to
achieve behavior change and reduce ‘peak demand’ is key in the
future imaginaries of the Smart Grid. However, the construction of
consumers also include knowledge and engagement deﬁcits. Fol-
lowing this, instrumented and externally controlled Smart Homes
are included in the imaginaries, which can be seen as a way  of
reducing peak demand without actively engaged consumers.
There is an underpinning tension between (i) the techno-
epistemic network’s emphasis on the security of supply as a public
good on the one hand, and (ii) the autonomy and privacy rights
of individuals on the other hand. Several examples in the empiri-
cal material show how the former seems to come at the expense
of the latter. Potentially substantial social implications, such as
privacy, security, external control of appliances within private
households, health-related issues, environmental perspectives and
consequences for ﬁnancially vulnerable households, are not being
sufﬁciently addressed and to some extent also being reduced to
technical issues.
This illustrates that the complexity of this technoscientiﬁc inno-
vation process call for including different kinds of competencies
and expertise, beyond the current core network of energy experts.
The introduction of smart meters has been met with public resis-
tance in many countries, for example in the Netherlands. In the
Dutch case, this was mainly due to privacy issues and a lack of
democratic legitimacy. The lessons learned included a need for a
more open and transparent communication to the public and the
inclusion of a variety of interests and perspectives ([67] Cuijpers
and Koops; [68] Hoenkamp et al.).
Encouraging institutional self-reﬂexivity with regards to
assumptions and commitments, as well as more open commu-
nication about future imaginaries as well as the decision-making
process could be a way of potentially increasing democratic legit-
imacy and possibly contributing to institutional trustworthiness
([71] Wynne; [38] Giddens; [68] Hoenkamp et al.). Addressing
complexity by the recognition of a multiplicity of legitimate per-
spectives (inspired by [34,66] Funtowicz and Ravetz) and including
a larger degree of public participation and dialogue could fascilitate
increased sensitivity to social implications, and in that sense con-
tribute to a more “socially robust” process. As stated by Collins and
Evans ([73]: 136); “it is rare to ﬁnd a technological decision that calls
for nothing more than the opinions of specialists”.
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